This is worth remembering:
- The scope depends on the outcome of the divorce proceedings,
- Support of the former spouse in the situation of falling into want - also in the case of divorce without adjudication of guilt,
- In the case of a ruling of sole fault of one of the spouses - alimony even if the spouse is not in want, but his or her financial situation has significantly deteriorated,
- The alimony obligation ceases when the recipient enters into a new marriage.
The admissibility of seeking alimony from a former spouse depends primarily on the final outcome of the divorce case.
Thus, a divorced spouse who was not found solely guilty decay of marriage and who is in want, may demand from the other divorced spouse to provide means of subsistence to the extent corresponding to the legitimate needs of the entitled person and the earning and property possibilities of the obligor, and this regardless of whether the other spouse is at fault for the decay of the relationship or not.
In the event that one of the spouses is recognized as a solely guilty The breakdown of the marriage, and divorce entails Significant deterioration in the financial situation of the innocent spouse, the court, at the request of the innocent spouse, may rule that the solely guilty spouse is obliged to contribute to an appropriate extent to the satisfaction of the justified needs of the innocent spouse, even though he or she is not in want.
According to the position of the Supreme Court, shared by common courts, including the courts in Poznań, when assessing whether there has been a material deterioration in the material situation of the innocent spouse, it is necessary to take into account the material conditions of that spouse that he or she would have had if the other spouse had duly fulfilled his or her obligations and if the spouses had continued to live together.
In order to assess whether the premise of material deterioration of the material position exists, a comparison of each innocent spouse's material position with the position that would have existed if the divorce had not been pronounced at all must be carried out. What is not relevant, however, are the changes, if any, that have occurred in the material position of the innocent spouse in the time between the actual separation of the spouses and the divorce decree. The privilege of the innocent spouse is that he can claim alimony from the guilty spouse, even if he is not in want. As the Supreme Court emphasizes, while the adopted regulation does not give the innocent spouse the right to an equal standard of living with the obligated spouse, the innocent spouse is entitled to a more prosperous standard of living than the satisfaction of justifiable needs.
The obligation to provide maintenance to a divorced spouse is not unlimited in time and expires if that spouse enters into a new marriage. However, when the obligor is a divorced spouse who has not been found guilty of marital breakdown, the obligation also expires at the end of five years from the divorce decree, unless due to exceptional circumstances the court, at the request of the entitled party, extends the said five-year period. Failure to extend the aforementioned five-year period by virtue of a court judgment therefore results in the termination of the alimony obligation of the divorced spouse.
According to the view of the Supreme Court, a demand for the provision of maintenance by a spouse who has not been found guilty of marital decay may also be made after the expiration of the five-year period - however, it must invoke exceptional circumstances that existed even before the expiration of this period. These exceptional circumstances will be, among other things, sudden, unforeseen events (e.g., accidents causing disability), but also certain diseases leading to a breakdown of health. Exceptional circumstances, on the other hand, cannot be considered, for example, the gradual loss of strength, ailments and illnesses of the former spouse requesting an extension of the five-year term, affecting him as he lives (so: the Supreme Court in its judgment of September 3, 1998, I CKN 1029/97).
